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Abstract
This study presents the adaptation of the Uncertainty Response Scale (Greco & Roger, Pers. Individ. Differ, 31:519-
534, 2001) to Portuguese. This instrument was administered to a non-clinical community sample composed of 1596
students and professionals, allowing a thorough validity and invariance analysis by randomly dividing participants
into three subsamples to perform: an exploratory factor analysis (sample one: N = 512); a preliminary confirmatory
factor analysis to identify the final solution for the scale (sample two: N = 543); and the confirmatory factor analysis
(sample three: N = 541). Samples two and three were also used for multi-group analysis to assess measurement
invariance, invariance across gender, sociocultural levels, and students versus active professionals. Results showed
the scale reflects the original factorial structure, as well as good internal consistency and overall good psychometric
qualities. Invariance results across groups reached structural invariance which provides a confident invariance
measurement for this scale, while invariance across gender and sociocultural levels reached metric invariance.
Accordingly, differences between these groups were explored, by comparing means with multi-group analysis to
establish the scale’s sensitivity toward social vulnerability, by demonstrating the existence of statistically significant
differences regarding gender and sociocultural levels on how individuals cope with uncertainty, specifically in terms
of emotional strategies, as a self-defeating strategy. Thus, females scored higher on emotional uncertainty, as well
as low sociocultural levels, compared with higher ones. Therefore, it is proposed that this scale could be a sound
alternative to explore strategies for coping with uncertainty, when considering social, economic, or other
environmental circumstances that may affect them.
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Introduction
Uncertainty is pervasive to human life throughout space
and time. It is present in daily life situations (is it going
to rain today?), existential ones (professional and per-
sonal decisions), and our relationships with others (loved
ones’ illnesses), the world (uncertainty about unemploy-
ment during an economic crisis), and nature (fear of nat-
ural disasters in a geographical area prone to it).
Consequently, the way people cope with uncertainty and
uncertain events is of substantial importance. Research
in psychology concerning uncertainty began with experi-
mental conditions by authors such as Epstein and Rou-
penian (1970) and Averill, Olbrich, and Lazarus (1972),
exploring its relationship with stress and anxiety. Monat,
Averill, and Lazarus (1972) defined uncertainty as the
period of anticipation, before confronting a potentially
threatening event (or one perceived as such). In these
conditions, levels of stress would vary according to peo-
ple’s efforts to assess and respond toward the event.
Later, the concept of intolerance of uncertainty (IU) was
defined as the way people understand and process infor-
mation in situations that can be characterized as uncer-
tain and how they respond with a set of cognitive,
emotional and behavioral reactions (Freeston, Rhéaume,
Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994).
In this research context, two concepts were used inter-
changeably for decades (Grenier, Barrette, & Ladouceur,
2005): intolerance of ambiguity (IA) (Frenkel-Brunswik,
1948) and the previously mentioned IU. Some
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interpretations defined IA as a tendency that individuals
may demonstrate to interpret ambiguous situations as a
threat and source of discomfort (Kirton, 1981; Majid &
Pragasam, 1997; McLain, 1993). According to Bhushan
and Amal (1986), ambiguous situations involve novelty,
complexity, unpredictability, and uncertainty and people
may respond to these situations with a set of reactions:
cognitive (rigidity), emotional (discomfort, disapproval,
rage or anxiety), and behavioral (rejection or withdrawal).
Grenier et al. (2005) analyzed the development of the con-
cept of IU throughout time, highlighting different defini-
tions and how the first definitions of IU were very similar
to the ones of IA (Freeston et al., 1994). However, Dugas
et al.’ (2005) definition clearly reflects an emotional state
that is oriented toward the future, which will allow its dis-
tinction from IA, directed to situations of ambiguity that
take place in the present (Grenier et al., 2005). More re-
cently, Carleton (2016b) defines IU as “an individual’s dis-
positional incapacity to endure the aversive response
triggered by the perceived absence of salient, key or suffi-
cient information, and sustained by the associated percep-
tion of uncertainty” (p. 31). Based on contemporary
models involving uncertainty and on research results,
Carleton (2012, 2016a, 2016b), proposes that fear of the un-
known (defined as a propensity to experience fear caused
by the absence of information) may be the fundamental fear
from which all fears arise, as well as higher order con-
structs, such as anxiety sensitivity, which confirms the im-
portance of uncertainty to psychological well-being.
Early results on IU pointed out this construct as hav-
ing a unique contribution as a predictor of the develop-
ment of excessive worry (Dugas, Freeston & Ladoucer,
1997; Freeston et al., 1994), as a predictor of worry in
daily life, with a lower contribution to worry/generalized
anxiety disorder (GAD) than negative metacognitions
(Thielsch, Andor, & Ehring, 2015a; Thielsch, Andor, &
Ehring, 2015b), presenting a strong association with feel-
ings of worry that could not be explained by other re-
lated factors, such as anxiety or depression (Buhr &
Dugas, 2002), as well as processes as perfectionism and
perceived control (Buhr & Dugas, 2006). Results on the
combined effects of fear of anxiety and IU on worry,
demonstrated this fear increases in association with IU,
enhancing also the levels of worry (Buhr & Dugas,
2009). Various studies demonstrated that people diag-
nosed with GAD were more intolerant to uncertainty
than moderate worriers and individuals with other anx-
iety disorders (Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000),
which supported the notion of IU being characteristic of
worry and GAD. However, further research suggested a
relationship between IU and obsessive-compulsive
disorder (Gentes & Ruscio, 2011; Holaway, Heimberg, &
Coles, 2006; Jacoby, Fabricant, Leonard, Riemann, &
Abramowitz, 2013) and social anxiety (Boelen &
Reijntjes, 2009; Carleton, Collimore, & Asmundson,
2010; Teale Sapach, Carleton, Mulvogue, Weeks, &
Heimberg, 2015), as well as other anxiety-related disor-
ders, such as panic disorder, post-traumatic stress dis-
order, health anxiety (Boelen, Reijntjes, & Smid, 2015;
Carleton, Fetzner, Hackl, & McEvoy, 2013; Fetzner,
Horswill, Boelen, & Carleton, 2013; Fetzner et al., 2014;
Norton, 2005), but also depression (Hong & Cheung,
2015; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011). Therefore, recent
findings suggest IU is present across diagnostics (Carle-
ton, 2012), which led Thibodeau et al. (2015) to develop
scales measuring disorder-specific intolerance of uncer-
tainty, based on the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale
(IUS)—the DSIU.
For this study, the Uncertainty Response Scale (URS)
(Greco & Roger, 2001) was chosen to explore individual
differences in attitudes toward uncertainty and strategies
of coping with uncertainty and not people’s degree of
(in)tolerance. This study thus proposes to contribute to
the assertion of validity of a psychological measurement
scale for the assessment of coping strategies towards un-
certainty. Building on research on (in)tolerance of uncer-
tainty, (in)tolerance of ambiguity, and coping strategies,
the URS assesses individual differences in coping strat-
egies for uncertainty and to what extent uncertainty is
perceived as stress inducing. It is composed of three di-
mensions: (1) emotional uncertainty as a maladaptive
strategy of coping with uncertainty, as an emotional
orientation to the problem (correlated with higher levels
of neuroticism, reduced self-esteem, emotional rumin-
ation, and difficulties to emotionally disconnect before
stress inducing situations); (2) cognitive uncertainty,
representing coping strategies based on planning and
control of uncertainty and so focused on the problem
(correlated with tolerance of ambiguity and inversely
correlated with social sensitivity, within neuroticism, and
with impulsivity); and (3) desire for change, as a positive
view of uncertainty and an enjoyment of change (corre-
lated with extraversion, specifically with impulsivity). In
its original studies, the scale was assessed through ex-
ploratory and confirmatory factor analyses demonstrat-
ing good internal consistency and overall psychometric
qualities (Greco & Roger, 2001, 2003). Therefore, this
scale allows an exploration of emotional coping strat-
egies (that may or may not result in inhibitory behav-
iors), of cognitive coping strategies (that focus on
preparing and planning for the future through a process
of reduction of unknowns and, therefore, of reduction of
uncertainty), and of a tendency to enjoy change and un-
certainty, which could prove useful as another approach
to understanding coping with uncertainty.
Through the concept of coping, it is intended to
analyze people’s interpretation of uncertainty and the
general strategies used to deal with it, not reducing them
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to a fixed set of resources but considering them as part of
the process of giving meaning to uncertainty, considering
the living circumstances that surround the individual.
Therefore, the personal interpretation of a situation is
considered as resulting from the psychological develop-
ment of the individual and so these strategies may change
along personal development (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).
Consequently, coping with a specific situation may entail
avoidance, minimization, or acceptance of stress inducing
conditions. In this sense, strategies focused on emotional
features are used to diminish distress or increase it, allow-
ing to transform the meaning given by the individual to
the situation, and, thus, cope with it (as emotional uncer-
tainty may); strategies focused on the problem are directed
toward the environment and its transformation or to self-
transformation to deal with the situation (as cognitive un-
certainty may). Ultimately, we cannot blame the victim for
failing to adapt since the main problem relies in the rela-
tionship/transaction between people and the social/envir-
onmental structures in which they live and that this
relationship should be the real target of change (Lazarus
& Folkman, 1984).
This paper will thus present results of the process of
adaptation of the URS to Portuguese, assessing its factor
structure, validity, and reliability through a thorough
assessment of three subsamples from a non-clinical
community sample of 1596 participants. Multi-group
measurement invariance analysis will be assessed, as well
as invariance across gender, sociocultural levels, and
students versus active professionals (employed or un-
employed). To do so, invariance will be tested hierarch-
ically, according to common practice. So, configural
invariance will mean the factor structure to be the same
across the groups tested, that is, whether similar factors
are measured; metric invariance refers to the similarity
of factor loadings across groups, besides the previous
level of invariance (which allows for comparison of re-
gression slopes); scalar invariance, besides the previous
levels of invariance, guarantees that intercepts (latent
means) are equivalent across groups, and so factors can
be compared; error variance invariance (same factor
structure, factor loadings, and error variances), and, fi-
nally, structural invariance, which also includes equal
factors’ covariance (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). To the
best of our knowledge, no study has ever tested multi-
group invariance of the URS, as well as these variables’
invariance. These are particularly important analyses,
considering measurement invariance across groups is
vital to ensure comparability of scores and to ensure the
test measures the same construct, with the same mean-
ing, across groups or cultural variables, such as gender
(Vandenberg & Lance, 2000).
So, to demonstrate this scale’s potential and validity,
the differences between demographical groups (as
indicative of social and economic circumstances) on
their responses to URS’ dimensions will be explored,
specifically: gender, sociocultural level, and students
(from different levels, from technical training to post-
graduate students) versus professional participants
through multiple-group modeling. It is hypothesized that
underprivileged/vulnerable social groups (women, lower
sociocultural levels) may present maladaptive strategies
to cope with uncertainty, specifically higher levels of
emotional uncertainty and, possibly, lower levels of de-
sire for change. In fact, there is evidence in sociological
qualitative research that vulnerable social groups, due to
increased strain living circumstances, tend to exhibit
lower levels of control over uncertainty and may resort
to self-defeating strategies to cope with it (Marris, 1996).
In this sense, one may consider emotional strategies of
coping with uncertainty, as defined in this scale, as self-
defeating strategies. Therefore, the final objective of this
study is to demonstrate the usefulness of the scale for
analyzing coping strategies toward uncertainty, by ex-
ploring differences between groups that may adopt dif-
ferent strategies to cope with uncertainty.
Despite the fact that Greco and Roger (2001) only
found an effect of gender on systolic blood pressure in a
post-task period, women are expected to show higher
levels of emotional uncertainty, as it was found in re-
search that focused on similar concepts, with adolescents
and adults (Dekkers, Jansen, Salemink, & Huizenga,
2017; Eaton et al., 2012; Koerner & Dugas, 2008), and
we can assume they can report lower levels of desire for
change, given it implies a positive view on uncertainty.
Accordingly, based on results that show that individ-
uals from lower sociocultural levels are more likely to
perceive an environmental threat (economic uncertainty,
in these cases) as uncontrollable (Griskevicius et al.,
2013; Griskevicius, Delton, Robertson, & Tybur, 2011), it
is hypothesized that these groups may also demonstrate
difficulties of coping with uncertainty. Furthermore, the
authors conclude that this feeling of uncontrollability
may lead people from lower sociocultural levels to resort
to “fast strategies” (evolutionary strategies focused on re-
productive efforts) that prove ultimately ineffective when
facing social threats. Therefore, if these groups experi-
ence uncertainty as more uncontrollable, they may re-
veal higher levels of emotional coping and lower levels
of desire for change. So, these strategies may be consid-
ered self-defeating strategies and, bearing in mind the
use of the URS is here proposed to be able to explore
differences in coping strategies as influenced by environ-
mental circumstances, testing differences between socio-
cultural levels seeks to demonstrate its usefulness for
exploring other social circumstances.
Since there is no evidence of differences of coping with
uncertainty between students and professionals, no
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differences are expected between these groups. However,
considering the added uncertainty that can be found in
professional contexts and in the labor market, as well as
its psychological effects (de Witte, Pienaar, & de Cuyper,
2016; Giunchi, Emanuel, Chambel, & Ghidlieri, 2016;
Jesus et al., 2016; Martín-Artiles, Molina, & Carrasquer,
2016; Mauno, Cheng, & Lim, 2017; Obschonka & Silber-
eisen, 2015), it was decided to explore if there could be
any differences between these two groups. On the other
hand, university and technical/professional courses’ stu-
dents may also feel an added strain of uncertainty, by
anticipating the transition to the labor market, which
would explain if no differences were found.
In brief, this study has the following aims: (1) to pro-
vide evidence for the validity and psychometric proper-
ties of the Portuguese version of the URS (testing it
through Exploratory Factor Analysis, Confirmatory Fac-
tor Analysis, Reliability Assessment, and Multi-Group
Invariance); (2) to demonstrate the capacity of the scale
to differentiate groups regarding coping strategies to-
ward uncertainty. In order to do so, invariance for gen-
der, sociocultural level, and students versus professionals
was tested. Group differences were assessed by compar-
ing means through multi-group models, and it was hy-
pothesized that (i) women may demonstrate higher
levels of emotional coping and lower levels of desire for
change; individuals from lower sociocultural groups may
present higher levels of emotional coping and lower
levels of desire for change. Regarding students and pro-
fessionals, no hypothesis was formulated since there are
no previous results in literature that would support for
any specific differences. Data was collected online,
through a cross-sectional design, resorting to a non-
clinical community, convenience sample.
Methods
Sample
The complete sample is composed of 1596 participants,
from which 55.6% are students and 44.4% are profes-
sionals, with an age average of 26.9 (standard deviation
(SD) 8.66), and 70.7% females. Regarding sociocultural
level distribution (SCL), 36.1% are from middle-lower/
lower levels, 19.9% middle level, and 44% middle-upper/
upper levels1. To perform the analyses intended in this
study, this sample was randomly divided in three subsam-
ples, which are composed as described in Table 1. Consid-
ering these sample characteristics, the only variable with
missing values (m.v.) is age, distributed as following: EFA
(sample 1) six m.v.; CFA1 (sample 2) five m.v.; CFA2
(sample 3) nine m.v., in a total of 20 in the complete sam-
ple. This study was carried out in accordance with the rec-
ommendations and approval of the Ethics Committee of
the Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences of the
University of Porto, in Portugal. All participants gave writ-
ten informed consent in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki.
Measures
Sociodemographic questionnaire
Includes sociodemographic and situational questions
considered pertinent for sample characterization, namely
gender, years of schooling, and professional situation.
The sociocultural level was calculated based on years of
schooling and professional situation of the active profes-
sionals, and on years of schooling and professional situ-
ation of the parents of students.
Uncertainty response scale
Its original version used a scale of four points, but it was
decided to change it to a Likert-type scale of five points
(between never and always) to increase items’ sensitivity,
giving participants more answering options by allowing
a midpoint to be available through an odd scale and so,
the possibility of a neutral position (Streiner, Norman, &
Cairney, 2008). This instrument is composed of 48 items
distributed in a three-factor structure: emotional uncer-
tainty with 15 items (reacting to uncertainty with anxiety
and sadness, considering it to be a stressor—α = .89 in
its original study); cognitive uncertainty with 16 items
(as a need to plan, clarify and gather information to re-
duce uncertainty—α = .85); and desire for change with 17
items (as a feeling of enjoyment and desire towards unex-
pectedness and change—α = .90) (Greco & Roger, 2001).
For the initial adaptation of the Uncertainty Response
Scale (URS) to Portuguese, Casanova, Pacheco, and Co-
imbra (2010) contemplated linguistic and cultural differ-
ences, not only translating but adapting meanings and
idiomatic expressions to Portuguese, respecting the con-
tents of the items and its equivalency to assure eco-
logical validity (Casanova, 2010; Casanova, Pacheco &
Coimbra, 2010; Casanova & Coimbra, 2011). Two exam-
ples of this process of adaptation of expressions would
be with the items: «Facing uncertainty is a nerve-
wracking experience», which became «Deparar-me com
a incerteza é uma experiência que me “dá cabo dos ner-
vos”», by using a colloquial expression in Portuguese cul-
turally adjusted; and «When making a decision, I am
deterred by the fear of making a mistake», which was
translated to «Quando tenho de tomar uma decisão,
quase paraliso pelo medo de cometer um erro», to use
the metaphor of paralysis, which is quite used within this
context in Portuguese. In this process, the authors con-
sulted a group of linguistic experts and of researchers in
1Most participants were identified as middle and upper levels of SCL
since this variable was defined by mostly considering educational levels
and so this is not considered a measure of socio-economic levels. Fur-
thermore, the form of data collection (online) constrains access to
other segments of population.
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Psychology, concluding the facial validity analysis with
ten interviews with possible participants to guarantee
measure equivalency (Tanzer & Sim, 1999; Van de Vijver
& Hambleton, 1996).
Procedures
The sample was collected using an online platform. Sev-
eral Higher Education Institutions, Training Companies
and Centers were contacted, requesting collaboration in
the dissemination of the study via email to students and
former students, along with the link to the online ques-
tionnaire. The email and online questionnaire included a
brief explanation of the research and clear, specific, and
univocal instructions, while guaranteeing confidentiality
and anonymity, allowing abandonment of participation
at any moment of the process (Tanzer & Sim, 1999; Van
de Vijver & Hambleton, 1996).
By randomly dividing the sample into three independ-
ent samples, the following analyses were performed with
the URS: (a) an exploratory factor analysis (sample one);
(b) a preliminary confirmatory factor analysis (CFA1
with sample two); (c) a concluding CFA (CFA2 with
sample three); (d) reliability analysis (for the three sam-
ples, according to the analyses performed with each
one). With the samples used in the confirmatory factor
analyses (samples two and three), multi-group confirma-
tory analysis was performed to explore the scale’s invari-
ance (e). Furthermore, a subsample was randomly
extracted from both these samples to explore gender in-
variance with a balanced sample in terms of gender,
seeking to maintain the same sample size, around 500
participants. (f) Finally, group differences for gender and
sociocultural level were assessed through multi-group
analysis, using the samples used for the multi-group
confirmatory analysis (g). Figure 1 presents the data ana-
lysis procedure and its steps.
Descriptive statistics and exploratory factor analysis
were performed using IBM SPSS Statistics 24; confirma-
tory factor analyses and multi-group analyses were per-
formed using IBM SPSS Amos 24. Thirteen missing
values (m.v.) were identified in ten of the URS’ items and
so all participants were kept. Statistical analyses using
IBM SPSS Statistics 24 were performed excluding missing
values cases’ listwise. In confirmatory factor analysis and
invariance analyses, m.v. were imputed using regression
imputation, according to the CFA’s structure.2
CFA was performed to assess if the covariance struc-
ture of the model was similar to the covariance structure
of the data (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). Using the max-
imum likelihood method, the global quality of factorial
adjustment was assessed by the main indices and values
of reference recommended, assessing its adjustment as
proposed by Brown (2006): chi-square test and the chi-
square/degrees of freedom between 1 and 2, Compara-
tive Fit Index (CFI) above .90, the root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA), P[RMSEA ≤ 0.05]
below .80. The quality of local adjustment was assessed
by individual reliability. Therefore, various indices were
considered, in view of the sensitivity of the chi-square
test to sample size and are here reported (Jackson, Gil-
laspy, & Purc-stephenson, 2009). Model Expected Cross
Validation Index (MECVI) composite measure will be
2Distribution of missing values (m.v.) per item: 1 m.v. on items 5, 8,
10, 11, 13, 28, 46; 2 m.v. on items 7, 15, 42. These m.v. were randomly
distributed by the three samples: 7 items in the EFA Sample; 4 items
in the CFA1 Sample; 2 items in the CFA2 Sample. Considering these
were imputed for the CFA’s, they do not impact the following
analyses, just impacting the EFA sample and the analyses related to it.
Table 1 Demographic characteristics by sample (gender, sociocultural levels, students vs. professional, and age) and sample
comparison
Gender Sociocultural levels (SCL) Type of participant Age
Male Female Lower Middle Upper Students Professionals
Complete sample
(N = 1596)
468 (29.3%) 1128 (70.7%) 576 (36.1%) 318 (19.9%) 702 (44.0%) 888 (55.6%) 708 (44.4%) 26.9 (8.61)
EFA (Sample 1)
(N = 512)
143 (27.9%) 369 (72.1%) 182 (35.5%) 102 (19.9%) 228 (44.5%) 282 (55.1%) 230 (44.9%) 26.8 (8.53)
CFA1 (Sample 2)
(N = 543)
165 (30.4%) 378 (69.6%) 199 (36.6%) 105 (19.3%) 239 (44%) 309 (56.9%) 234 (43.1%) 27.6 (9.31)
CFA2 (Sample 3)
(N = 541)
160 (29.6%) 381 (70.4%) 195 (36.0%) 111 (20.5%) 235 (43.4%) 297 (54.9%) 244 (45.1%) 26.3 (7.86)
Sample
Comparison
χ2 (df)
.79 (2) .35 (4) .54 (2) ANOVA for age: F(2, 1573) = 3.3,
p = .04, ηp2 = .004
Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey
HSD test indicate that the mean
score for Sample 2 is significantly
different from Sample 3
Sample
comparison p
value
.67 .99 .76
Gender, sociocultural status, and type of subject characterized by n and (%); age characterized as Mean (SD); χ2 Chi-Square; df degrees of freedom, ANOVA
analysis of variance
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used to compare model fit, being lower scores a demon-
stration for the goodness of fit and simplicity of one
model over the other.
Category 1 invariance was tested through multi-group
confirmatory factor analysis, which allows a hierarchical
comparison of the unconstrained model with models in
which measurement weights, measurement intercepts,
structural covariances, and measurement residuals are
gradually constricted. The chi-squared difference test
was used to assess statistical significance between
models. However, considering that differences in chi-
square are also dependent on sample size, other criteri-
ons were used, namely the Δ CFI, considered when
smaller than or equal to − .01 (Cheung & Rensvold,
2002). On the other hand, considering that the num-
ber of items and factors affects most adjustment
indices, except for RMSEA (Cheung & Rensvold,
2002), Δ RMSEA (considered when < .015), and Δ
standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) are
also presented, considered when < .025, for loading
invariance (Chen, 2007).
Furthermore, category 2 invariance was tested with the
groups that proved at least metric invariance, by analyz-
ing between-group differences in latent means, to dem-
onstrate the data’s substantive research interest (Cheung
& Rensvold, 2002).
Fig. 1 Data analysis procedure and steps
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Results
Descriptive statistics for the individual items of URS
were computed to assess its sensitivity (range, means,
medians, SD, skewness, and kurtosis) and assert the ful-
fillment of assumptions for performing exploratory fac-
tor analysis and structural equation modeling. Data
collected in the three subsamples presents acceptable
scores of skewness and kurtosis (Kline, 2005)—highest
skewness (sk) and kurtosis (ku) found in items 15 (sk =
− 2.14 and ku = 4.55) and 25 (sk = − 1.77 and ku = 4.39)
(see Additional file 1: A). A few univariate outliers were
identified but were kept in the samples. Preliminary as-
sumption testing was conducted to check for normality,
linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogen-
eity of variance-covariance matrices, and multicollinear-
ity. No serious violations were noted.
Exploratory factor analysis
Casanova et al. (2010) performed preliminary analysis on
this scale, using other extraction and rotation methods
(Casanova, 2010; Casanova, Pacheco & Coimbra, 2010;
Casanova & Coimbra, 2011). In this study, principal axis
factoring (PAF) was used to follow the strategy of the
original validation by Greco and Roger (2001), through a
reflective model (in contrast with a formative one, which
means that in a reflective model, underlying latent
causes are what creates effects on indicators and high
inter-correlations are expected) (Boorsboom, 2006), with
Oblique rotation, since dimensions represent latent vari-
ables and were expected to be correlated. In the first
analysis, before rotation, most intercorrelations between
items proved moderate and low which contributed to
the interpretation of unidimensionality in each subscale
(Clark & Watson, 1995)—the highest correlation is.68
between items 9 and 13). The anti-image diagonal re-
vealed values above .5 as expected. Bartlett’s sphericity
test was significant, but the sample size must be consid-
ered given the test’s sensitivity to it and Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin proved satisfactory (.92) (Tabachnick & Fidell,
1996/2007). The scree plot analysis and the values of ini-
tial eigenvalues (higher than one) confirmed the three
factors solution, which was tested using a conventional
exclusion criterion of .40. Seven items were eliminated,
as follows: item 33 from the dimension emotional uncer-
tainty; items 18 and 32 from the dimension desire for
change; and items 2, 21, 22, and 48 from the dimension
cognitive uncertainty, achieving a final solution of 41
items in which items loaded in the expected factors.
Table 2 presents factor’s means, SD, and correlations be-
tween factors. Additional file 2: B includes factor’s eigen-
values and variance explained, and Additional file 3: C
presents the URS distribution with items’ loadings that
result from this EFA.
Preliminary confirmatory factor analysis (CFA1)
The original study of this scale used item parceling in its
CFA given the scale’s length (Greco & Roger, 2001).
With the purpose of developing a shorter and robust
version of the scale, it was decided not to use this pro-
cedure, starting by performing a preliminary CFA for
the 41 items, with the second subsample extracted from
the complete one. This CFA, thus, assumed an explora-
tory nature, allowing to examine internal structure
validity and to identify items that did not contribute sig-
nificantly to the model.
In our first analysis, the three factor model of URS re-
vealed low fit (Model A): X2/df = 3.40, CFI = .80, TLI =
.79; RMSEA = .067; P[RMSEA ≤ 0.05] < .001. Additional
file 4: D presents the standardized coefficients of CFA1,
with the URS distribution after EFA (sample 2)—model
A. To achieve a shorter version of the scale and higher
reliability, it was decided to retain all items with stan-
dardized regression weights above .55 (achieving a prac-
tical significance of .31, almost one-third of item
variance). So, 16 items were eliminated, as follows: item
1, 44, and 46 from the dimension emotional uncertainty;
items 6, 19, 20, 26, 28, 29, and 30, from the dimension
cognitive uncertainty; and items 14, 15, 16, 17, 40, and
42, from the dimension desire for change. Considering it
was a long scale, and that the final version still is com-
posed of 11 items on emotional uncertainty, six items on
cognitive uncertainty, and eight items on desire for
change, and bearing in mind the content of the items
remaining and of the items eliminated, content validity
is believed to have been respected, as it seems to be con-
firmed by reliability results that will be presented further
on. The model then achieved a good measurement fit
considering the following indices (Model B1): X2/df =
2.70, CFI = .93, TLI = .92; RMSEA = .056; P[RMSEA ≤
0.05] = .002. However, modification indices (considering
as threshold 11) suggested the correlation between er-
rors of items 9 and 10; items 11 and 13 (within the emo-
tional uncertainty dimension); and items 25 and 26
(within the desire for change dimension). Considering
the model modification indices found and the theoretical
content shared between these items, it was decided to
include these correlations in the final model. The model
then achieved the following results (model B2): X2/df =
2.38, CFI = .94, TLI = .93; RMSEA = .051; P[RMSEA ≤
Table 2 URS—mean, standard deviation, and correlations
between factors (EFA—sample 1)
Factor Mean Std. deviation 1 2 3
Emotional uncertainty (1) 41.3 9.71
Cognitive uncertainty (2) 51.2 6.91 .33**
Desire for change (3) 53.8 7.84 − .34** .09
**p < .001
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0.05] = .422. Comparison between models B1 and B2
through the chi-square difference revealed a significant
better fit of model B2, (X2 (3) = 93, p < .001), as well as
a lower MECVI (1.66 vs. 1.50), confirming the better fit
of model B2. Regarding the chi-square values, it is im-
portant to consider the sample size which is commonly
accepted to negatively influence models that show a
good fit (Bentler, 2007). Additional file 5: E presents the
standardized coefficients of this CFA1 with the final
URS distribution (sample 2)—model B2.
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA2)
In order to confirm the internal structural validity of the
scale, another CFA was performed with sample three.
Table 3 presents results, comparing the preliminary CFA
with the second CFA. The model achieved a good qual-
ity of adjustment considering the following indices: X2/
df = 2.49, CFI = .93, TLI = .92; RMSEA = .052;
P[RMSEA ≤ 0.05] = .2. Table 4 presents the final solu-
tion of the URS and each item’s standardized regression
weights. Complete results from this CFA can be found
in the Additional file 6: F—CFI above .90, the root mean
square error of approximation, RMSEA, P[RMSEA ≤
0.05] below .80. The quality of local adjustment was
assessed by each items’ standardized regression weights.
Additional file 7: G presents the Portuguese adaptation
of the URS, including all 48 items, highlighting the items
that were retained in this final version.
Reliability
Cronbach alpha coefficients were calculated for the three
samples (considering the final confirmatory factor solu-
tion) and composite reliability was calculated for the
samples used for the CFA1 and CFA2, showing that the
scale has satisfactory psychometric properties. To asses
convergent validity, factor loadings (standardized regres-
sion weights) were used to calculate the average variance
extracted (AVE), presenting values that can be consid-
ered as acceptable despite the lower values in sample
3—CFA2 (Hair Jr., Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998).
Therefore, construct validity was supported by factorial
validity, supporting item’s specification, and its distribu-
tion in the scale’s structure. Discriminant validity of each
factor was assessed by comparing each factor’s AVE to
the square of correlations between factors. Given that
these were inferior to the AVE of the factors involved,
discriminant validity was found between all factors.
Table 5 presents internal consistency of each factor, the
average variance extracted, and composite reliability.
Multi-group invariance analysis
After reaching the final solution and thereby examining
the scale’s internal structure validity, multi-group invari-
ance was analyzed by comparing the samples used for
both CFA’s through a series of measurement invariance
tests to assess configural invariance by comparing model
fit indices of both samples. These results revealed a good
fit for groups, proving the same factor structure of the
scale in both samples and thus allowing a comparison of
domains. Results proved configural invariance of the
model: X2/df = 2.44, CFI = .93, TLI = .93; RMSEA =
0.036; P[RMSEA ≤ .05 > .99]. By analyzing the Δ χ2 test
(and respective p value), metric invariance is proved
given that factor loadings were found invariant. More-
over, results seem consistent in terms of scalar invari-
ance and error covariances (variance/covariance of
residuals found invariant). Finally, covariances of factors
were also found invariant and so it is believed that there
is sufficient evidence of the scale’s configural, metric,
scalar, error variance, and structural invariance, allowing
a comparison of regression slopes, factor means, and
items’ means. Using the criterion of Δ CFI (Cheung &
Rensvold, 2002), the value of Δ CFI for each invariance
test confirms the scale’s invariance. Table 6 presents
these results in detail.
Multi-group invariance analysis—gender
A subsample was randomly extracted from samples two
and three (used for CFA1 and CFA2—see Fig. 1) to
achieve a balanced sample for gender invariance assess-
ment. Table 7 presents invariance results for gender,
demonstrating an acceptable fit in terms of configural
invariance: X2/df = 1.95, CFI = .90, TLI = .89; RMSEA =
.043; P[RMSEA ≤ .05 > .99]. Furthermore, metric invari-
ance was proved through the Δ χ2 test (and respective p
value) and Δ CFI. The fact that the Δ RMSEA and the Δ
Table 3 Goodness of fit indices for the model of the confirmatory factor analyses for the URS with sample 2 (CFA1) and sample 3
(CFA2)
CFA1 (N = 543) CFA2 (N = 541)
χ2 (df) p χ2/df CFI TLI RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE χ2 (df) p value χ2/df CFI TLI RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE
Model A 2636 (776) p < .001 3.40 .80 .79 .067 .064 .069 < .001
Model B1 734 (272) p < .001 2.70 .93 .92 .056 .051 .061 .02
Model B2 641 (269) p < .001 2.38 .94 .93 .051 .046 .056 .42 668 p < .001 2.49 .93 .92 .052 .047 .057 .20
χ2 Chi-square, df degrees of freedom, p p value, CFI comparative fit index, TLI Tucker-Lewis Index, RMSEA root mean square error of approximation, LO 90 lower
limit of a 90% confidence interval for the population value of RMSEA, HI 90 upper limit of a 90% confidence interval for the population value of RMSEA, PCLOSE
RMSEA p value
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SRMR kept within expected boundaries for structural in-
variance, as proposed by Chen (2007), gives further sup-
port to findings on gender metric invariance.
Multi-group invariance analysis—sociocultural levels
The samples used for multi-group analysis (samples 2 and 3,
used for CFA1 and CFA2—see Fig. 1) were joined to test
invariance regarding three groups of sociocultural levels.
Table 8 presents results, demonstrating an acceptable fit in
terms of configural invariance: X2/df = 2.13, CFI = .92, TLI =
.91; RMSEA = .032; P[RMSEA ≤ .05 > .99]. Moreover, the
model achieved metric invariance, by the results of the Δ χ2
test (and respective p value), Δ CFI, and Δ RMSEA, although
the following levels of invariance were not proven.
Table 4 Distribution URS (final Portuguese version) with original formulations of items, in English—CFA1 (sample 2)
Items Standardized regression
weights
Emotional
uncertainty
4 - Sudden changes make me feel upset. .73
5 - When making a decision, I am deterred by the fear of making a mistake. .65
8 - When the future is uncertain, I generally expect the worst to happen. .61
9 - Facing uncertainty is a nerve-wracking experience. .80
10 - I get worried when a situation is uncertain. .77
11 - Thinking about uncertainty makes me feel depressed. .71
13 - Uncertainty frightens me. .81
31 - When I can't clearly discern situations, I get apprehensive. .60
35 - When uncertain about what to do next, I tend to feel lost. .69
36 - I feel anxious when things are changing. .62
41 - When a situation is unclear, it makes me feel angry. .61
Cognitive
uncertainty
3 - I feel better about myself when I know that I have done all I can to accurately plan my
future
.60
7 - I like to have things under control. .57
27 - I like to know exactly what I'm going to do next. .72
39 - I try to have my life and career clearly mapped out. .70
43- I like things to be ordered and in place, both at work and at home. .61
47 - I like to plan ahead in detail rather than leaving things to chance. .74
Desire for change 12 - I find the prospect of change exciting and stimulating. .64
23 - I feel curious about new experiences. .77
24- I like to think of a new experience in terms of a challenge. .74
25 - A new experience is an occasion to learn something new. .66
34 - New experiences can be useful. .69
37 - New experiences excite me. .85
38 - I think variety is the spice of life. .59
45- I easily adapt to novelty. .63
Table 5 Construct reliability and validity for the uncertainty response scale (Portuguese version) for the three samples
Sample 1 (EFA) Sample 2 (CFA1) Sample 3 (CFA2)
Dimensions α (n = 505)
(Greco & Roger, 2001)
N.
items
N. items Portuguese
version
α (n =
512)
N. items Portuguese
final version
α (n = 543) RC AVE α (n = 541) RC AVE
Emotional
uncertainty
0.89 15 14 .89 11 .91 .91 .48 .91 .91 .47
Cognitive
uncertainty
0.85 17 13 .86 6 .82 .83 .45 .78 .80 .40
Desire for
change
0.90 16 14 .87 8 .88 .88 .49 .85 .86 .44
Totals – 48 41 – 25 – – – – – –
α Coefficient Cronbach alpha, RC reliability composite, AVE average variance extracted
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Multi-group invariance analysis—students and
professionals
Regarding the test of multi-group invariance for students
versus professionals, the same samples were used. For
these groups, acceptable model fit indices were found for
configural invariance: X2/df = 2.50, CFI = .93, TLI = .92;
RMSEA = .037; P[RMSEA ≤ .05 > .99]. Metric invariance
was not proven, considering the p value of the Δ χ2 test,
although results for Δ CFI, and Δ RMSEA, fall within ac-
cepted boundaries for metric invariance, as can be ana-
lyzed in Table 9. Therefore, for caution purposes, it was
decided not to test differences between these groups.
Gender and SCL group differences using multi-group
analysis
In order to explore the scale’s sensitivity, multiple-group
analyses were performed on gender and sociocultural
level, joining samples 2 and 3, to compare means be-
tween these groups. It was hypothesized that women
and individuals from lower sociocultural backgrounds
could present maladaptive strategies to cope with uncer-
tainty, specifically higher levels of emotional uncertainty
and lower levels of desire for change. So, the means of
the latent factors of emotional uncertainty, coping with
uncertainty, and desire for change in males and females
were analyzed through a series of restricted hierarchical
models that were compared to a model of means’ equal-
ity, by using males as a reference group. All p values
were calculated using the Bonferroni correction to avoid
type I errors. Through this procedure, statistically sig-
nificant differences were found for emotional uncer-
tainty, using a Z test of critical ratios, providing evidence
for the hypothesis that women present higher levels of
emotional uncertainty than men (B = .33; p < .05). No
differences were found for cognitive coping, while differ-
ences for desire for change proved non-significant.
Therefore, our hypothesis was partly confirmed.
Regarding sociocultural levels, the same procedures
were followed. However, considering this variable is
composed of three groups, a step-by-step analysis was
Table 6 Models’ comparison for invariance tests for URS for samples CFA1 and CFA2)
Invariance level Definition Model χ2 df Δ χ2 Δ
df
p CFI RMSEA Δ
CFI
Δ
RMSEA
Δ
SRMR
Configural
invariance
Same factor structure M1 1310.183 538 .93 .036
Metric invariance Same factor structure and factor loadings M2-
M1
1329.172 560 18.989 22 .65 .93 .036 0 0 .000
Scalar invariance Same factor structure, factor loadings, and intercepts M3-
M2
1350.831 585 21.659 25 .66 .93 .035 0 -.001 0
Error variance
invariance
Same factor structure, factor loadings, and error
variances
M4-
M3
1359.107 591 8.275 6 .22 .93 .035 0 0 .002
Structural
invariance
Same factor structure, factor loadings, error
variances, and factors’ covariance
M5-
M4
1391.799 616 32.692 25 .14 .93 .034 0 -.001 .001
χ2 Chi-square, df degrees of freedom, Δ χ2 difference between model’s χ2, Δ df difference between models’ df, p p value, CFI comparative fit index, RMSEA root
mean square error of approximation, Δ CFI difference between model’s CFI’s, Δ RMSEA difference between model’s RMSEA, Δ SRMR difference between model’s
standardized root mean square residuals, M1 to M5 models tested
Table 7 Models’ comparison for invariance tests for URS for gender invariance (subsample from samples CFA1 and CFA2: N = 520;
268 females; 252 males)
Invariance
level
Definition Model χ2 df Δ χ2 Δ df p CFI RMSEA Δ CFI Δ RMSEA Δ SRMR
Configural
invariance
Same factor structure M1 1050.663 538 .90 .043
Metric
invariance
Same factor structure and factor loadings M2-M1 1077.083 560 26.420 22 .234 .90 .042 − .001 − .001 .002
Scalar
invariance
Same factor structure, factor loadings, and
intercepts
M3-M2 1167.271 585 90.189 25 < .001 .89 .044 − .012 .002 .000
Error variance
invariance
Same factor structure, factor loadings, and
error variances
M4-M3 1169.948 591 2.676 6 .848 .89 .043 .001 − .001 .001
Structural
invariance
Same factor structure, factor loadings, error
variances, and factors’ covariance
M5-M4 1211.157 616 41.209 25 .022 .89 .043 − .003 0 .001
χ2 Chi-square, df degrees of freedom, Δ χ2 difference between model’s χ2, Δ df difference between models’ df, p p value, CFI comparative fit index, RMSEA root
mean square error of approximation, Δ CFI difference between model’s CFI’s, Δ RMSEA difference between model’s RMSEA, Δ SRMR difference between model’s
standardized root mean square residuals, M1 to M5 models tested
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performed, by comparing lower levels with middle or
higher levels; middle levels with lower or higher ones;
and higher levels with the lower or middle levels. No sta-
tistically significant differences were found between mid-
dle levels and the other ones, and between higher levels
and the other ones, for any of the dimensions. Statisti-
cally significant differences were found through a Z test
of critical ratios between lower and middle or higher
sociocultural levels, showing that lower sociocultural
levels revealed more emotional uncertainty (B = .16; p <
.05) than the other sociocultural levels. Furthermore,
lower sociocultural levels showed lower levels of desire for
change than middle or higher sociocultural levels (B =
− .079) but these differences did not remain significant,
using the Bonferroni correction. There were no significant
differences for cognitive uncertainty for these groups.
Discussion
This study aimed to contribute to the development of a
psychological measure in Portuguese for the assessment
of strategies of coping with uncertainty, focusing on the
scale’ factor structure, validity and reliability, as well as
group invariance and invariance across gender, sociocul-
tural levels, and students versus active professionals,
concluding with an exploration of the scale’s sensitivity
to demographical variables, searching for group differ-
ences. Concerning these demographical variables, it was
expected that women and individuals from lower SCL
would demonstrate higher levels of emotional uncer-
tainty and lower levels of desire for change. No differ-
ences were expected between types of participants—
students and active professionals.
Validation results demonstrate the process of adapta-
tion respected the original scale since all items loaded
within their expected factors, supporting construct valid-
ity. The strategy of performing a preliminary CFA
proved useful since it allowed to reduce the number of
items, while maintaining its structure and psychometric
qualities, reaching a good adjustment quality, which was
confirmed by the second CFA performed. The scale
proved to be reliable and valid, with very good to excel-
lent internal consistency values and good composite
Table 8 Models’ comparison for invariance tests for URS for sociocultural level invariance (joining samples 2 and 3, N = 1084)
Invariance level Definition Model χ2 df Δ χ2 Δ
df
p CFI RMSEA Δ CFI Δ
RMSEA
Δ
SRMR
Configural
invariance
Same factor structure M1 1717.985 807 .92 .032
Metric
invariance
Same factor structure and factor loadings M2-
M1
1777.097 851 59.111 44 .064 .92 .032 − .002 0 .001
Scalar
invariance
Same factor structure, factor loadings, and
intercepts
M3-
M2
1876.510 901 99.413 50 < .001 .92 .032 − .004 0 .000
Error variance
invariance
Same factor structure, factor loadings, and error
variances
M4-
M3
1888.243 913 11.734 12 .467 .92 .031 0 − .001 .007
Structural
invariance
Same factor structure, factor loadings, error
variances, and factors’ covariance
M5-
M4
2001.239 969 112.996 56 < .001 .91 .031 − .005 0 .001
χ2 Chi-square, df degrees of freedom, Δ χ2 difference between model’s χ2, Δ df difference between models’ df, p p value, CFI comparative fit index, RMSEA root
mean square error of approximation, Δ CFI difference between model’s CFI’s, Δ RMSEA difference between model’s RMSEA, Δ SRMR difference between model’s
standardized root mean square residuals, M1 to M5 models tested
Table 9 Models’ comparison for invariance tests for URS for students and professionals invariance (joining samples 2 and 3; N =
1084)
Invariance level Definition Model χ2 df Δ χ2 Δ
df
p CFI RMSEA Δ CFI Δ
RMSEA
Δ
SRMR
Configural
invariance
Same factor structure M1 1345.358 538 .93 .037
Metric
invariance
Same factor structure and factor loadings M2-
M1
1388.303 560 42.946 22 .005 .93 .037 − .002 0 .001
Scalar
invariance
Same factor structure, factor loadings, and
intercepts
M3-
M2
1483.317 585 95.013 25 < .001 .92 .038 − .006 .001 .000
Error variance
invariance
Same factor structure, factor loadings, and error
variances
M4-
M3
1486.278 591 2.962 6 .814 .92 .037 0 − .001 .000
Structural
invariance
Same factor structure, factor loadings, error
variances, and factors’ covariance
M5-
M4
1576.363 619 90.085 28 < .001 .92 .038 − .005 .001 .000
χ2 Chi-square, df degrees of freedom, Δ χ2 difference between model’s χ2, Δ df difference between models’ df, p p value, CFI comparative fit index, RMSEA root
mean square error of approximation, Δ CFI difference between model’s CFI’s, Δ RMSEA difference between model’s RMSEA, Δ SRMR difference between model’s
standardized root mean square residuals, M1 to M5 models tested
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reliability levels, contributing to a sense of “global qual-
ity,” as proposed by Borsboom, Mellenbergh, and Heer-
der (2004). Furthermore, divergent reliability results,
assessed by AVE, reached acceptable levels.
Multi-group measurement invariance of the scale
reached very good results across groups, proving struc-
tural invariance of the scale, which renders psychometric
support to the comparability of cross-sectional studies
using the URS. Invariance across gender and sociocul-
tural levels reached metric invariance, which allows for
the comparison of regression slopes. However, compar-
ability of these results must be assessed with caution and
so, invariance among these groups should be verified by
further studies. Furthermore, only configural invariance
was proved between students and professionals, which
may indicate disagreement on how the constructs mani-
fest for these groups. Consequently, group differences
using multi-group analysis were not performed between
students and professionals. Nevertheless, it was decided
to explore group differences through multi-group ana-
lysis for gender and SCL, considering their results of Δ
RMSEA and Δ SRMR for scalar invariance, as proposed
by Chen (2007), as well as the Δ CFI for SCL in the as-
sessment of scalar invariance (Cheung & Rensvold,
2002).
Concerning the results of group differences through
multi-group analyses, an effect of gender was found, spe-
cifically within emotional uncertainty, in which women
obtained higher scores, as previously found in researches
on IU, in the inhibitory IU subscale (Dekkers et al.,
2017), which provides additional support for the scale’s
sensitivity across gender. In addition, differences were
found, as hypothesized, between different SCL in terms
of emotional uncertainty. These results support the
scale’s definition of emotional uncertainty as a maladap-
tive strategy to cope with uncertainty, what can be inter-
preted as a self-defeating strategy to which people may
resort when faced with challenges felt as overwhelming
and uncontrollable, that may reinforce conditions of vul-
nerability. These results are supported by previous re-
search that demonstrates that, as fear of the unknown
increases, people prefer to accept its negative conse-
quences than to tolerate uncertainty (Buhr & Dugas,
2002; Ghosh & Ray, 1997; Rassin & Muris, 2005), as well
as results that demonstrated that people from lower
SCL, when facing uncertainty, could resort to strategies
that may prove inefficient (Griskevicius et al., 2013; Gris-
kevicius, Delton, Robertson, & Tybur, 2011). No signifi-
cant differences were found between these groups
(gender and SCL) for the dimension desire for change,
as in the original study for gender (Greco & Roger,
2001), which may mean that this variable does not dif-
ferentiate social groups and so, that groups that experi-
ence greater social security or stability, as men or
individuals from higher SCL, do not necessarily reveal a
higher desire for change.
The existence of significant differences for gender and
SCL levels regarding emotional uncertainty supports the
scale’s sensitivity to distinguish groups, which supports
its criterion and concurrent validity. These results are
reinforced by previous findings with similar constructs,
such as the ones of Koerner and Dugas (2008), in which
being a female predicted negative appraisals of ambigu-
ous scenarios. Even though other studies show no gen-
der effects on IUS (Allan, Oglesby, Uhl, & Schmidt,
2016), others found that gender could be a predictor of
implicit memory for uncertain and neutral words but
not necessarily IU (Francis, Dugas, & Ricard, 2016), and
others found significant gender effects in the contrary
direction (adolescent boys scored higher on IU)—in this
particular case, cultural differences could be the origin
of these results (Barahmand, 2008). Nevertheless, these
results may be explained by the fact that IUS focuses on
individual vulnerabilities, in which there may be no ef-
fects of gender, while URS, by focusing on coping strat-
egies, may allow to identify an effect of gender in
resorting to such self-defeating strategies, when people
face greater environmental strain. This is supported by
results on the predictive capacity of emotion regulation
strategies for anxiety and worry and its differences in
terms of gender (Zlomke & Hahn, 2010).
No effects of gender or SCL were found on cognitive
uncertainty as expected. This was expected given empir-
ical results that demonstrate that only an emotional
orientation to problems (compared to a cognitive or be-
havioral one) contributed to the prediction of worry in
its relationship to intolerance of uncertainty (Dugas,
Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997). Moreover, considering
the parallel established between cognitive uncertainty
and prospective IU subscale, in Dekkers et al.’s (2017)
findings, there were also no gender differences in pro-
spective IU.
In terms of limitations, this study is based on a con-
venience sample, with unbalanced groups, and so, these
results could be supported by further studies, namely, of
invariance across gender, sociocultural levels, and differ-
ent groups from the general population. A possibility is
to further explore the effect of SCL in a more balanced
sample and to explore the relationship of coping with
uncertainty with other significant concepts, which would
give further evidence of the scale’s convergent and con-
current validity, which were assessed with positive re-
sults in the original studies of Greco and Roger (2001,
2003). Moreover, it would be useful to explore its longi-
tudinal invariance and predictive power through longitu-
dinal studies. Despite these limitations, results attest to
the scale’s value and that it could make a meaningful
contribution in research by allowing an additional
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perspective for the examination of uncertainty, as a comple-
ment to the construct of IU, already greatly investigated.
Conclusions
To sum up, regardless of the reduction of the number
of items, the scale provides a psychometrically sound
assessment of coping strategies toward uncertainty in
a shorter version, which may be an advantage in fu-
ture applications. Furthermore, this scale may prove
useful for the understanding of coping strategies to-
ward uncertainty, expanding possibilities of research
on uncertainty on community samples. Given that
fear of the unknown, as defined by Carleton (2012,
2016a, 2016b) may be considered as the fundamental
fear, and as an evolutionary and adaptive one, we can
reason that despite different levels of (in)tolerance of
uncertainty, all people experience psychological chal-
lenges in coping with uncertainty. Furthermore, since
fear of the unknown “…may encompass external en-
vironmental uncertainties and threats and an individ-
ual’s internally oriented uncertainty about his or her
own resources to deal with such threats” (Hong &
Cheung, 2015; p.904), URS may allow for an approxi-
mation, along with other psychological measures, to
analyzing this interaction between environmental un-
certainties and perception on internal resources,
which are affected by individual and social circum-
stances. Consequently, building on initial results
found in this study on demographical variables, it
would be relevant to further explore if coping strat-
egies vary according to other dimensions of social
vulnerability and living contexts (such as unemploy-
ment or underemployment, socioeconomic levels, eth-
nic backgrounds, schooling levels, among others that
may characterize impoverished or in danger
communities), which would prove useful for a psycho-
social take on uncertainty through quantitative
methodologies.
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